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Abstract
We develop an adjustment procedure to construct U.S. monthly time series of involun-
tary part-time employment stocks and flows from 1976 until today. Armed with these new
data, we provide a comprehensive account of the dynamics of involuntary part-time work.
Transitions from full-time to involuntary part-time employment dominate this dynamics,
spiking up at recessions’ onsets and persisting well into recovery periods. On the other
hand, weaknesses in job creation contribute little to these fluctuations. Our data and
findings are relevant to inform a broader assessment of labor market performance and to
develop models of cyclical labor adjustment.
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1 Introduction
At the trough of the Great Recession involuntary part-time work (or part-time for economic rea-
sons) reached nearly 5 percent of the labor force, receiving considerable attention and scrutiny
from scholars and policymakers.1 More generally, as Figure 1 illustrates, involuntary part-
time employment exhibits a stable pattern of large countercyclical variation around recessions.
While nothing indicates that these fluctuations have limited information, they play a minor role
in our understanding of labor market dynamics. Indeed, most of our knowledge in this area
remains based on the behavior of the unemployment rate (Rogerson and Shimer [2011]), which
is also the headline statistic to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the labor market. One
explanation for this state of affairs is the very strong co-movement between involuntary part-
time employment and unemployment (contemporaneous correlation in levels of 79%), which
could suggest there is little additional data in involuntary part-time work fluctuations. In this
paper, we argue that this conclusion is premature. We show that worker flows in and out of
involuntary part-time work carry important information for diagnosing the health of the labor
market and for advancing our knowledge on cyclical labor adjustment.
Our conclusions build on two insights. First, conceptually, involuntary part-time work con-
stitutes a distinct labor market state with respect to both unemployment and other employment
states. Like unemployment, individuals’ desired labor supply is constrained, giving individuals
additional incentives to search for better employment opportunities. Unlike unemployment,
individuals maintain an ongoing relationship with their employer. This distinctiveness has the
potential to inform us about different dimensions of labor dynamics which, in turn, can teach
us something new about the mechanisms governing labor adjustment.2 Second, we know from a
long literature that analyzes unemployment fluctuations based on workers flows, that a similar
behavior of worker stocks can mask large differences in the levels and cyclicality of the under-
lying worker flows (see e.g. Darby et al. [1986], Blanchard and Diamond [1990] and Blanchard
and Portugal [2001]). Therefore, to compare involuntary part-time work and unemployment
we need to go beyond Figure 1 and analyze their worker flows.
We measure and analyze transition probabilities between involuntary part-time employ-
ment, employment and non-employment states over the past four decades. Our investigation is
organized around two sets of questions. We start by asking descriptive questions on the patterns
of involuntary part-time employment turnover. What are the levels of transition probabilities
between involuntary part-time work and other labor market states? How do they behave over
the business cycle? How have these relationships evolved over the past forty years? The second
set of questions is substantive. We ask: what is the additional information conveyed by fluc-
tuations in the ins and outs of involuntary part-time employment? What does it tell us about
1See Blanchflower and Levin [2015] and Daly et al. [2016] for evidence on the negative impact on wage
growth during the aftermath of the Great Recession; Even and Macpherson [2018] and Valletta et al. [2018]
for results showing a shift of the U.S. labor market towards more intensive use of part-time employment; and
Yellen [2014] for concerns expressed by the Federal Reserve.
2Consistent with our insights, recent research suggests that, descriptively, fluctuations in part-time employ-
ment are important to understand the cyclical behavior of the aggregate wage (Daly and Hobijn [2016] and
Kurmann and McEntarfer [2017]) and hours per worker (Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé [2019]).
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the state of the economy and the mechanisms underlying labor adjustment?
Our answer to the first set of questions can be summarized in three main findings. First,
there are substantial differences in the average behavior of involuntary part-time work flows
compared to those of unemployment. Involuntary part-time employment spells are shorter than
unemployment, and workers in that state move primarily in and out of other employment states,
whereas unemployment interacts mainly with full-time employment and non-participation. Sec-
ond, we document very large cyclical variation in transitions between involuntary part-time
employment and full-time employment, with patterns that are stable across recessions and sim-
ilar to those of unemployment. Recessions are characterized by a jump upwards in inflows from
full-time employment, followed by a prolonged decline in outflows to full-time employment.
Third, while turnover between employment and unemployment exhibits a pronounced secular
decline, no apparent trend is visible in its involuntary part-time employment counterpart.
In answering the second set of questions, we draw one main conclusion, with several implica-
tions. Contrary to a common view in the literature, we find that the high levels of involuntary
part-time work during and after recessions are unlikely to reflect weak job creation (i.e. the
lack of new full-time employment opportunities). In contrast, our analysis points to contin-
ued fragility of ongoing employment relationships, and which is the reflection of a different
adjustment channel compared to job creation/destruction. Reallocation to part-time employ-
ment affects workers who are strongly attached to the labor market and it persists well into
recessions’ recoveries. This is especially important to understand the aftermath of the Great
Recession, when employed workers faced a persistently elevated probability to move to invol-
untary part-time work. In terms of the long-run evolution of the U.S. labor market, the decline
in the probability faced by full-time workers of becoming unemployed is not matched by a de-
crease in the probability to move to involuntary part-time work. This points to a change in the
composition of labor market risk, away from unemployment and towards involuntary part-time
employment, implying that employment spells may last longer but also have a more unstable
work schedule.
Our findings are based on time series data of monthly stocks and flows of involuntary part-
time employment from 1976 until today, which we assembled through a new methodology.
Current knowledge of U.S. involuntary part-time employment dynamics is limited to the two
latest recessions. The reason behind this limitation is the redesign of the Current Population
Survey (CPS) in 1994, which introduced substantial changes to the measurement of involuntary
part-time work.3 We propose a novel adjustment protocol that allows us to extend the time
series of involuntary part-time employment stocks and flows back to 1976, thereby increasing
the number of recessions that can be analyzed from two to five. We are making our data
publicly available so that others can verify our results and extend them in the direction taken
by their own research. In addition to this methodological contribution, our paper contributes
to the literature on labor market dynamics by extending the analyses of involuntary part-time
employment during the Great Recession and its aftermath by Cajner et al. [2014], Canon et al.
3Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé [2019] use CPS data from the Earner Study questions collected in the Merged
Outgoing Rotation Groups files of the CPS to construct series of part-time employment flows from 1976 to 2017.
While those data provide one way around the break introduced by the CPS redesign, they cannot be used to
estimate stocks of involuntary part-time work.
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[2014], Warren [2015], Lariau [2017] and Farber [2017], and by complementing recent analyses
of unemployment fluctuations (see Fujita and Ramey [2009], Elsby et al. [2009], Shimer [2012]
and Elsby et al. [2015]).4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces data and measurement issues.
Section 3 sets out our adjustment protocol to address these issues and presents our empirical
framework. Sections 4 and 5 describe our main findings and their interpretation. Section 6
concludes. An online appendix (OA) with supplementary results accompanies the paper.
2 Data and Measurement
CPS data. Our main source of data is the CPS. The CPS, administered by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS), has informed the majority of studies on worker flows in the U.S. labor
market. Each basic monthly (BM) file of the CPS contains individual information on about
60,000 households, including employment, hours worked and workers’ reasons for working part-
time. Its rotational design can be used to measure workers’ flows across up to four consecutive
months. In addition to the monthly survey, the CPS records information on individuals’ labor
market situation over the past calendar year in the Annual Social and Economic Supplement
(ASEC), also known as the March files. Our adjustment procedure (Section 3) relies on the
combination of the BM and ASEC files.5
Definitions. We adopt the BLS definition of part-time employment: we count as part-
time workers individuals who usually work (strictly) less than 35 hours per week.6 It is worth
stressing that the notion of usual hours is different from that of actual hours, which refers to
hours worked during the survey’s reference week. As we explain momentarily, this distinction
matters for deriving certain aggregate measures from the CPS.
Our definition of involuntary part-time employment is based on the following question posed
to respondents who report less than 35 hours of weekly work (see U.S. Bureau of the Census
[2017]):
Some people work part time because they cannot find full time work or because busi-
ness is poor. Others work part time because of family obligations or other personal
reasons. What is (name’s/your) MAIN reason for working part time?
The first sentence of the question above singles out individuals who are counted as involuntary
part-time workers.
The ASEC uses similar concepts of part-time and involuntary part-time employment, but
measures them at an annual frequency. Accordingly, individuals are classified as working part-
4In addition to studying a longer time period, we address different research questions and we comprehensively
quantify the contribution of worker flows to the dynamics of involuntary part-time employment. We complement
research on unemployment dynamics by characterizing those fluctuations based on a richer model, featuring
three employment and two non-employment states.
5We use all BM files that are publicly available, i.e. since January 1976. Unfortunately, the BM files prior
to this date used to construct the BLS series plotted in Figure 1 are not publicly available.
6The threshold of 35 hours is the most commonly used in U.S. labor market statistics. We show in Section
E of the OA that our results are robust to using a different cutoff to define part-time employment.
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time in the past calendar year if they report working less than 35 hours in most (i.e. more than
50 percent) of their working weeks over the preceding year. They are considered involuntary
part-timers if the main reason for working part-time for at least one week was either because
they could not find full-time work or due to poor business conditions.
The 1994 redesign. In January 1994, the monthly CPS underwent a complete overhaul
(Cohany et al. [1994], Polivka [1996]). Among the various changes introduced in the revised ver-
sion, two directly affect the measurement of part-time and involuntary part-time employment.7
First, it started recording usual hours for all employed individuals from all rotation groups,
irrespective of actual hours worked during the survey’s reference week. Prior to the redesign,
information on usual hours worked and reasons for working part-time were only collected for
individuals who reported working less than 35 actual hours per week.8 Second, the concept of
involuntary part-time work was made more precise, by explicitly including the predicate that
the individual wants and is available to work full-time. To the extent that this requirement
captures a constraint on desired labor supply, it aligns the notion of involuntary part-time work
with that of unemployment.
While the changes introduced in the redesigned CPS make it the most accurate source of
data for our purposes, they pose a significant challenge to study the evolution of involuntary
part-time employment over a long time period. On the one hand, the increased scope of the
question on usual hours worked is likely to lead to an increase in the count of part-time workers
after 1994. On the other, the more stringent definition of involuntary part-time work is likely to
cause a decrease in the count of involuntary part-time workers after 1994. Consistent with these
predictions, and as we illustrate below, the series of stocks of overall part-time and involuntary
part-time workers computed from the basic monthly survey show a prominent break in 1994.9
Therefore, some protocol must be devised to make the series derived from old CPS consistent
with those based on the post-1994 definitions.
3 Empirical Approach
Before presenting our adjustment protocol for the 1994 break, we introduce the framework used
to study the dynamics of involuntary part-time employment.
3.1 Framework
To uncover the sources of cyclical variation in involuntary part-time employment (I), we relate
it to two states of non-employment, unemployment (U) and non-participation (N), and two
employment states, full-time employment (F ) and voluntary part-time employment (V ). It is
7See Section A of the OA for the relevant parts of the old and revised CPS questionnaires.
8The revised survey also introduced questions to distinguish hours worked at all jobs from hours worked
at the primary job for individuals who work multiple jobs. In the OA, we use data from the revised survey to
show that multiple jobholding does not drive our conclusions.
9The effects on labor market stocks are compounded in the series of worker flows, but the direction of
changes is more difficult to predict.
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useful to distinguish V from F , as its dynamic interaction with involuntary part-time employ-
ment is fundamentally different. Formally, we condense the description of the labor market in
period t in the vector
st =
[
F V I U N
]′
t
. (1)
Each element of st denotes the stock (or count) of workers in each labor market state. Accord-
ingly, the involuntary part-time employment rate, it, plotted in Figure 1, is given by:
it =
It
Ft + Vt + It + Ut
. (2)
To decompose fluctuations in the stocks that compose it, we link their behaviors to the evolution
of transition probabilities. We assume that st follows a first-order Markov chain:
st = Mtst−1, (3)
where Mt is the matrix of transition probabilities p (j → k) across states j and k.
3.2 Our adjustment protocol
In Section 2 we described the source of bias that affects the measurements of most labor market
stocks and flows prior to 1994. We propose a two-step adjustment protocol to overcome this
issue and estimate the model described in the previous subsection.
Step 1: Adjusting stocks. To illustrate the problem and the proposed solution, Figure 2
shows alternative series of stocks of voluntary (Plot 2a) and involuntary (Plot 2b) part-time
employment. In each plot, the step function (dotted line) denotes data based on the ASEC and
the solid line data from the BM files. The CPS redesign entails a discontinuity in the solid lines
in January 1994, and shifts the stocks in the expected directions (cf. Section 2). In contrast,
the annual series do not show any noticeable break at 1994, as the ASEC was not subject to
any substantial changes. The basic principle of our adjustment protocol is to require that the
discrepancy between the ASEC-based and BM-based time series remains constant across the
1994 break. The dashed lines in Figure 2 are the outcome of implementing this requirement.
The levels of the series are well aligned with the 1994 ones, and mere visual inspection suggests
their volatility is also similar.
We now formalize this approach. Let sBMy,m denote the series calculated from the BM files,
where s ∈ {V, I} and y and m refer, respectively, to calendar years and months. Likewise,
denote by sASECy the series calculated from the ASEC. We observe sASECy throughout the whole
period, but prior to 1994 we have a biased measurement of sBMy,m, which we denote by a breve
superscript s˘BMy,m. To obtain an estimate of sBMy,m prior to 1994, we first compute the predicted
yearly average of sBMy,m before the CPS redesign, ŝ
BM
y . We construct it by running a regression
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of sBMy,m against sASECy using data from the post-revision period:10
sBMy,m = ϑ0 + ϑ1s
ASEC
y + εy,m, y = 1994, . . . , 2007, m = 1, . . . , 12. (4)
The next step involves using ŝBMy to derive ŝBMy,m, an estimate of sBMy,m prior to 1994. We focus
on linear specifications, i.e. we posit the following relationship: ŝBMy,m = φ0,y + φ1,ys˘BMy,m. Though
simple, this relationship allows the coefficients φ0,y and φ1,y to vary across years. To find φ0,y
and φ1,y, we minimize the distance between the predicted yearly average and the yearly average
of the adjusted time series, i.e. we solve
min
φ0,y ,φ1,y
1993∑
y=1976
(
ŝ
BM
y −
1
12
12∑
m=1
(
φ0,y + φ1,ys
BM
y,m
))2
. (5)
At this level of generality, the minimization problem has too many degrees of freedom. There-
fore, we explore two alternative sets of restrictions: (i) using multiplicative coefficients only (i.e.,
φ0,y = 0 for all y) and (ii) using additive coefficients only (i.e., φ1,y = 1 for all y). Our preferred
model involves using multiplicative factors.11 Solving the problem above under restriction (i),
we get φ1,y = ŝ
BM
y / 1
12
∑12
m=1 s˘
BM
y,m.
After adjusting Vt and It in the manner just described, we recover Ft by using the accounting
identity Et = Ft + Vt + It and the fact that total employment (Et) is correctly measured in the
BM files prior to 1994. Before moving on to step 2, we verify the robustness of our approach
through internal and external validity checks presented in Section B of the OA.
Step 2: Adjusting flows. Having obtained consistent monthly time series of labor market
stocks, we use them to correct the series of flows. We are able to do so because, put together,
the series of corrected stocks and properties of our markovian framework (viz. equation (3))
impose sufficient restrictions to correct the transition probabilities without any additional data
or assumptions. In practice, we implement a margin-error adjustment (see Elsby et al. [2015],
and Section C of the OA for details). In standard applications, this adjustment is used to
make transition probabilities computed from longitudinally-linked data, which are affected by
rotational sample attrition, consistent with changes in stocks computed from cross-sectional
data. The insight from applying it in this specific context is that, by targeting changes in the
corrected stocks from step 1, it addresses in addition the mismeasurement in worker flows prior
to the CPS redesign.12
10We experimented with different time windows to run this regression. Our favorite specification excludes
data after 2007, when the Great Recession hits the labor market and the correlation between the BM-based
and ASEC-based time series becomes less stable.
11The vast majority of research based on CPS data either assumes multiplicative adjustment factors or uses
the multiplicative factors tabulated by Polivka and Miller [1998] for certain aggregate measures. We discuss
relationships between these approaches and our adjustment protocol in Section B of the OA. In that section, we
also compare additive and multiplicative coefficients. Multiplicative coefficients have some appealing properties.
They rescale not only the mean but also the variance of the time series, and by construction they cannot predict
negative values when a time series is scaled down. The latter is an important advantage in practice, since the
stock of involuntary part-time workers is a small number.
12We implement margin-error adjustment for all periods covered by our data: prior to 1994, it addresses
both the biases induced by the old CPS and rotational sample attrition, while after 1994 it deals only with the
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3.3 Other adjustments
In addition to our proposed solution to the 1994 break, we adjust the series of stocks and
flows to deal with other measurement problems. Since the procedures to address those issues
were developed in previous work, we describe them succinctly in the main text, leaving the
details for Section C of the OA. First, prior to implementing the 1994 adjustment correction,
we seasonally-adjust the time series. Second, we also adjust them for potential misclassification
in workers’ reported labor market status, using Elsby et al. [2015]’s procedure to reclassify
potentially spurious transitions between voluntary and involuntary part-time employment, and
between unemployment and non-participation. Third, after the 1994 adjustment correction we
control for time-aggregation bias using Shimer [2012]’s method.
4 Main Findings
4.1 Average behavior
To get a first sense of the dynamics of involuntary part-time employment, we describe the
average behavior of its underlying transition probabilities and compare it to those of unem-
ployment. Inspection of the bottom row of Panel (a) in Table 1 shows that, with two-thirds
of the stock entering in the previous month (66.2 percent) and an almost similarly large share
leaving in the following one (59.5 percent), involuntary part-time employment exhibits much
faster dynamics compared to unemployment (cf. bottom row, columns 3 and 4 of Panel (a)).
Put differently, spells of involuntary part-time employment are, on average, about 35 percent
shorter than those of unemployment. Moving on to the interaction with specific labor mar-
ket states, there is a very close interaction between involuntary part-time work and full-time
employment. On average, 28.7 percent of all involuntary part-timers were employed full-time
in the previous month, and a similar fraction (28.9 percent) will enter full-time employment
next month. Transition probabilities between involuntary and voluntary part-time work are
smaller (though still more than half as large as those with full-time employment) followed by
slightly lower levels of turnover with unemployment.13 Flows between involuntary part-time
employment and non-participation are very small. By comparison, unemployment displays a
smaller but nonetheless strong interaction with full-time employment, and the flows to and
from non-participation are much greater (at least as high as those with full-time employment).
Last, the interaction between unemployment and both forms of part-time employment is very
limited.
4.2 Cyclical behavior
Figure 3 complements this static portrait by displaying the evolution of selected transition prob-
abilities. In each plot the same transition is shown both for involuntary part-time work (solid
latter issue.
13Recall that the numbers reported in Table 1 have been adjusted to remove potentially spurious transitions
between involuntary and voluntary part-time employment.
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line) and unemployment (dashed line). The most salient feature in the six plots is the sizable
variation of (most) transition probabilities around recessions. We first focus on the behavior
of inflows, starting with the series of inflow transitions from full-time employment (Plot 3a).
Similar to unemployment, the inflow probability to involuntary part-time employment spikes at
recessions’ onsets and returns to pre-crisis level during their aftermaths. However, its recovery
is much slower. In the typical recession, a year after the trough the unemployment inflow is al-
ready recovering, while the involuntary part-time employment inflow is still well above its peak
level. Inflows from voluntary part-time employment and non-participation bring to light differ-
ences in the cyclical dynamics across the two states (Plot 3c). While p (V → U) is surprisingly
acyclical, the behavior of p (V → I) is very similar, if more persistent, than p (F → I). This
picture is reversed for non-participation inflows displayed in Plot 3e. Though less pronounced,
p (N → U) is clearly countercyclical, while p (N → I) is at best mildly countercyclical and only
in the two most recent recessions. Next, we turn our attention to the evolution of outflows. The
three plots on the right-hand side column of Figure 3 show a much more consistent picture of
the dynamics of involuntary part-time employment and unemployment. With some differences
in the magnitude of variation, all six transitions move in the same direction over the business
cycle. They rise steadily in normal times and fall slowly starting around the beginning of each
recession, lasting over several years after the recession’s trough.
4.3 Decomposition of cyclical variation
So far we have identified very large cyclical variation in the ins and outs of involuntary part-
time employment. We now quantify their relative importance for the cyclical dynamics of the
labor market, by computing their contributions to the short-run variation of involuntary part-
time employment and unemployment. Specifically, for involuntary part-time employment we
calculate the following coefficients:
β (j → k) =
Cov
(
∆it,∆i˜t
jk
)
Var(∆it)
. (6)
∆i˜t
jk denotes changes in the counterfactual involuntary part-time employment rate whose evo-
lution is based on past and contemporaneous changes in the flow hazard λjk.14 The results are
reported in Panel (b) of Table 1.
The beta coefficients offer a precise and distinctive picture of involuntary part-time employ-
ment and unemployment dynamics.15 The ins and outs of full-time employment are quantita-
tively very important for both states, but more so for involuntary part-time employment than
unemployment. Adding up their contributions, flows to and from F explain 28.3 + 22.4 = 50.7
percent of fluctuations in involuntary part-time employment. The corresponding figure for un-
14The statistical decomposition is based on flow hazards λjk, which map one-to-one to transition probabilities
p (j → k) via the identity p (j → k) = 1− e−λjk .
15The bottom row displays the sum of beta coefficients. In both instances the sum is very close to 100
percent, meaning that each β (j → k) can be interpreted as the relative contribution of flow hazard λjk to the
cyclical variations under study.
9
employment is 42.6 percent. These numbers suggest focusing on understanding the behavior of
p (F → I) and p (I → F ) , as we do in the next subsections. If we add contributions from flows
in and out of voluntary part-time employment, transitions from employment states explain 76.5
percent of the variation in it. On the other hand, non-participation plays an important role in
explaining unemployment fluctuations (33.2 percent), in line with Elsby et al. [2015]’s analysis.
This suggests that involuntary part-timers and unemployed workers are quite different in terms
of their distance to full-time employment. Consistent with this notion, turnover between invol-
untary part-time work and unemployment is low and its cyclical behavior plays a small role in
the dynamics of involuntary part-time work and unemployment. In fact, changes in p (U → I)
explains less than 5 percent of the cyclical variation in the unemployment rate, and under 10
percent of fluctuations in involuntary part-time employment.
4.4 Zooming in on recessions
While useful to summarize variation over a long time period, the beta coefficients ignore po-
tential differences across recessions. Figure 4, which displays the monthly contributions of the
most relevant flows for changes in it around each recession, uncovers very interesting patterns.
First, all recessions are characterized by a jump upwards in p (F → I) at recessions’ onsets,
but its importance grows dramatically over time. Second, the sluggish recovery in p (I → F )
dominates the behavior of it during recessions’ aftermaths. In sum, p (F → I) plays a role
akin to the ‘jumpy’ job destruction rate (but is more persistent and explains the large variance
contributions of the ins), while p (I → F ) is similar to the ‘sluggish’ job-finding rate driving the
slow recovery of unemployment (Shimer [2012], Elsby et al. [2010]). A third interesting pat-
tern concerns the interaction between unemployment and involuntary part-time work. While
p (I → U) is consistently unimportant across the five recessions, the low levels of p (U → I)
during the recovery period push the involuntary part-time employment rate downwards. This
channel seems to become more relevant in the most recent recessionary episodes, which others
have called jobless recoveries.
4.5 Secular behavior
Before closing this section, we explore the long-run perspective afforded by our dataset to
study how the risks of involuntary part-time employment and unemployment have evolved over
time. A question that has received considerable attention in the literature concerns evidence
on dwindling U.S. business and employment dynamics (see e.g. Davis et al. [2010] and Hyatt
and Spletzer [2013]). Consistent with the literature, Figure 3 shows that unemployment inflows
describe a significant downward trend, whereas unemployment outflows show a less clear down-
ward trend starting around the 2000s. In contrast, over the same period involuntary part-time
employment inflows and outflows show no visible trend. This fact is quite surprising given the
presence of pronounced upward trends in p (F → V ) and p (V → F ) and downward trends in
p (N → V ) and p (V → N) (Section D5 of the OA).16 These findings indicate that, relative to
16In a previous draft of this paper, we highlighted that flows between full-time and overall part-time employ-
ment have increased secularly. The upward trends in the two directions tend to cancel one another, resulting
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the risk of becoming unemployed, full-time employed workers in the U.S. face an increasing risk
of working part-time and to do it involuntarily during recessions.
5 Interpretation and Discussion
We established that fluctuations between full-time and involuntary part-time work dominate
the cyclical variation in the involuntary part-time employment rate, and that the cyclical be-
havior of those transitions is similar to that of transitions between full-time employment and
unemployment. In our view, those fluctuations speak to different aspects of labor adjustment
compared to their unemployment counterparts. Our interpretation is that, following a negative
economic shock, full-time workers are “turned down” by their employers into working part-time
with the understanding that they will be brought back into full-time employment when busi-
ness conditions improve. In support of this hypothesis, we report in Section D1 of the OA that
the majority of transitions captured by p (F → I), as well as their cyclical variation, reflect
employment changes that occur at the same employer. Moreover, we find that the composition
of these transitions shifts markedly towards full-time workers who report facing slack work
conditions in their current job as the main reason for working part-time involuntarily (Section
D2 of the OA). On the other hand, p (F → U) reflects the decision to terminate employment
relationships – perhaps with the exception of temporary layoffs and recalls, as discussed below.
These differences point to a form of job heterogeneity, which determines whether, facing adverse
economic conditions, a full-time employment relationship is transformed into a part-time one
(leading to an F → I transition) or is terminated (F → U transition). The distinction between
mechanisms is even sharper when we consider movements in p (I → F ) and p (U → F ), as they
reflect fundamentally different economic choices. On the one hand, changes in p (U → F ) are
driven primarily by shifts in job creation. On the other, we find that changes in p (I → F )
entail, in the majority of cases, a return to a full-time work schedule (Section D1 of the OA).
These facts dovetail well with those reported in Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé [2019], who show
that part-time employment is an important margin of variable labor utilization.
In sum, our findings uncover a clear relationship between involuntary part-time work and
the fragility of full-time employment relationships, with very pronounced and stable patterns
over the business cycle. Therefore, fluctuations in involuntary part-time employment carry ad-
ditional information on the impact of the business cycle on the labor market. This point is best
illustrated in the large and persistent contribution of p (F → I) to elevated levels of involuntary
part-time work during recessions and their aftermaths (Figure 4). Its greater persistence rela-
tive to p (F → U) shows that, long after job destruction rates have returned to pre-crisis levels
(usually a few months after the recession’s trough), a large fraction of full-time employment
relationships remains unstable.17 The episode of the Great Recession is elucidative (Plot 4d).
in a stable share of part-time work in total employment.
17In preliminary analyses based on SIPP data, we condition the transition probability p (F → I) on job
tenure, and verify that full-time individuals at risk of working part-time involuntarily in recessions’ aftermath
are workers with a long-established relationship with their employer. This fact dovetails with the analysis of
the dynamics of involuntary part-time work within subgroups of the population presented in Section D4 of
the OA. During downturns, the composition of full-time employment and involuntary part-time employment
11
Thirty months after the recession’s trough, the contributions of flows from F to I remained
comparable to those of transitions in the reverse direction. This conclusion goes against a com-
mon view that high recessionary levels of involuntary part-time employment reflect “hidden
unemployment”. This view is enclosed in the BLS’s U-6 measure, which adds up involuntary
part-time employment to several categories of jobless workers, to obtain an extended measure
of non-employment.18 According to this metric, labor market slack means that too few jobs
are being created (which is why unemployment remains elevated), and that, amongst newly-
created jobs, too many positions are part-time instead of full-time (which is why involuntary
part-time employment remains elevated). Figure 4 shows that high rates of involuntary part-
time employment during recessions are not fueled by large inflows of unemployed workers.19
The composition of involuntary part-time work inflows by reasons (Figure D2 of the OA), which
is dominated by slack work conditions, reinforces this conclusion.
There is an interesting parallel to be drawn between our findings and recent facts uncovered
by Fujita and Moscarini [2017]. The authors document that a significant share of unemployed
workers face a high probability of being recalled by their previous employer, and that this
probability is not as cyclical as the job-finding rate.20 As they demonstrate, these facts are
relevant to inform and extend macro-search models of the labor market.
6 Conclusion
This paper addresses methodological breaks in data collection on involuntary part-time employ-
ment to construct monthly time series of stocks and flows from 1976 until today. We use these
new data to analyze the role of involuntary part-time work in U.S. labor market dynamics. We
think we have made important strides forwards, but are also keenly aware that our analysis
raises several questions. We hope future work will use our dataset to answer them.
shifts towards older and better educated workers, and these subgroups also experience higher relative increases
(decreases) in their group-specific p (F → I) (p (I → F )). However, these composition effects play a limited role
in the cyclical behavior of p (F → I) and p (I → F ).
18See https://www.bls.gov/lau/stalt.htm. The U-6 is the sum of total unemployment, all marginally
attached workers, and all involuntary part-time workers, divided by the civilian labor force plus all marginally
attached workers.
19In fact, we see that p (U → I) exerts a negative drag on the involuntary part-time employment rate during
recessions. p (U → I) exhibits no clear cyclical pattern that could easily explain this result. To understand it,
we undertake an analysis of the composition of involuntary part-time employment inflows (Section D2 of the
OA). The share of workers entering involuntary part-time work for lack of full-time jobs has fallen secularly over
time. Its main cyclical component is the inflow of unemployed workers. While this inflow rose sharply during
the twin recessions of 1980-1982, it was only mildly countercyclical in the last two decades.
20Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé [2018] use an incomplete-markets model calibrated to U.S. labor market data
and policies and find that involuntary part-time work generates lower individual welfare losses compared to
unemployment, attributting that difference to the higher probability to return to full-time work.
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Figure 1: The involuntary part-time employment and unemployment rates
Notes: BLS data, 1955m05 – 1975m12 and CPS data, 1976m01 – 2018m06. The series show the percentage
of involuntary part-time and unemployed workers divided by the civilian labor force. Data coming from
the BLS are the series ID LNS11000000 (Civilian Labor Force Level), LNS12032194 (Employment Level
- Part-Time for Economic Reasons) and LNS13000000 (Unemployment Level). The BLS data are aligned
to post-1976 CPS data using multiplicative adjustment factors. The post-1976 CPS data on involuntary
part-time work are corrected for the 1994 break. All series are adjusted for seasonality and smoothed by
one-period, two-sided MA averaging. The gray-shaded areas indicate NBER recession periods.
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Figure 2: Labor market stocks derived from the ASEC and the BM files of the CPS
Notes: CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data, 1976 – 2017; CPS basic monthly
(BM) data, 1976m01 – 2018m06. The ASEC data is annual. Data from the BM files (solid lines) is
monthly and discontinued in January 1994 due to the redesign of the CPS. The dashed lines prior to 1994
show the time series obtained after implementing our adjustment protocol, which combines information
contained in the ASEC and BM time series. Prior to making this adjustement, the time series based on
the BM files are corrected for seasonality. The reported figures are in million workers.
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Figure 3: Evolution of transition probabilities
Notes: CPS data, 1976m01 – 2018m06. Transition probabilities are corrected for the 1994 break, and
adjusted for misclassification, seasonality, margin error, and time aggregation. All series are smoothed by
two-period, two-sided MA averaging. Gray-shaded areas indicate NBER recession periods.
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(a) Twin recessions of the 1980s
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Figure 4: Contributions to the recessionary increase in involuntary part-time employment
Notes: CPS data. Each solid line shows the change in the involuntary part-time employment rate from its
value at time 0, the starting month of the corresponding recession. The other lines reports counterfactual
changes in the involuntary part-time employment rate predicted by specific transitions probabilities, i.e.
time series
∑t
τ=0 ∆i˜τ
jk where the ∆i˜t
jk’s are as defined in equation (6). The scale on the vertical axis is
different for the milder recessions (Plots 4b and 4c) and the large recessions (Plots 4a and 4d). Gray-shaded
areas indicate NBER recession periods.
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